The Constitutionality of Certain Indirect Approaches to Raising the Assessment Level by Stahr, Elvis J., Jr.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1948
The Constitutionality of Certain Indirect
Approaches to Raising the Assessment Level
Elvis J. Stahr Jr.
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stahr, Elvis J. Jr., "The Constitutionality of Certain Indirect Approaches to Raising the Assessment Level" (1948). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. Paper 2309.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2309
The Constitutionality of Certain Indirect
Approaches to Raising the
Assessment Level
By ELVIS J. STAHR, Jr.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Stahr is Dean of the University
of Kentucky College of Law and a member of the Kentucky and
New York bars. He holds A.B., B.A. in Jur., B.C.L., and N.A.
degrees.
It seems plain common sense that
among the most effective methods the
legislature might employ to effect the
raising of assessments toward the goal
of fair cash value would be the en-
actment of statutes giving practical
incentives to property owners and to
local assessment officers to start rais-
ing the level of assessments at the
grass roots. The constitutionality of
several types of such incentives will
be considered briefly in this article,
which is a summary of, longer memo-
randa of law.
I
May-the legislature prohibit the
writing of property insurance in
amount greater than the assessed
value of the property tp be insured.
It is believed that it could constitu-
tionally do so, for several reasons.
(a) Public policy. Equitable as-
sessment of property for tax purposes,
which does not now exist in Kentucky,
but which would indisputably be in
the public interest, can only be
achieved by adopting the same stand-
ard throughout the state. The stand-
ard prescribed by section 172 of the
Kentucky Constitution is fair cash
value. A statute whose object was to
aid in achieving that standard would
seem to have overriding considerations
of public policy in its favor.
(b) Constitutional mandate. It is
the duty of all branches of the state
government to give effect to the state
Constitution. A statute which sought
to implement an express mandate (sec-
tion 172) of that Constitution, even
by indirection, would be entitled to
the most favorable possible considera-
tion by the courts.
(c) Power of legislature to limit
corporate powers. The powers of
domestic corporate insurers are limited
to those set forth in their charters,
and those of foreign corporate in-
surers to those permitted by the laws
of the state where they seek to do
business. In Kentucky, the powers of
the latter may not exceed those of the
former (Constitution 202; Allin v.
American Indemnity Co., 246 Ky.
396). The powers of both may be
restricted or revoked by the legislature
at any time. Constitution 37 provides
that "every grant of a franchise, priv-
ilege or exemption, shall remain sub-
ject to revocation, alteration or amend-
ment." See Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs,
172 U. S. 557.
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1 lence it would seem that limits on
the amount of insurance which com-
panies may lawfully write on any one
piece of property may be set by the
legislature, in the exercise of its power
to amend or revoke corporate powers
and privileges. The only specific con-
stitutional restriction is that it must
act through a general law (Constitu-
tion 59 [17]).
A puzzling question as to the state's
power to regulate foreign insurance
corporations has existed since the de-
cision, in U. S. v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533
(1944), that insurance business is in-
terstate commerce when carried on
across state lines. A careful study of
the M cCarran Act (15 U. S. C. 1011-
1015), together with subsequent Su-
preme Court cases involving the point,
leads to the conclusion that, so long
as Congress refrains from regulating
interstate insurance business, the
states will retain their previous power
to do so, in all respects involved in
the instant problem. See 164 A. L. R.
500 and 34 A. B. A. J. 539.
(d) Police power of legislature to
regulate insurance. The Constitution
of Kentucky does not mention insur-
ance, hence contains no specific limi-
tation on the power of the legislature
to regulate it. Insurance is a business
affected with a public interest and
therefore may be regulated in the
exercise of the police power. "Corpo-
rations engaged in the business, both
domestic and foreign, must conform
their business and contracts to the pro-
visions of the statutes in the states
where they do business. . . . This
power . . . to regulate the business of
insurance is very broad." See 1 Couch
on Ins., sec. 244, and cases there cited.
Virtually every aspect of the busi-
ness has been subjected to regulation
by statutes of the various states, and
their constitutionality has been upheld.
See 36 A. L. R. 1512 and 72 A. L. R.
1173. A statute may limit the extent
of risk in any one policy (32 C. J.,
p. 983, 44 C. J. S., p. 522; Glens Falls
Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 126 S. W. 1114).
The amount of new business an in-
surance company may do may be
limited by statute (Bush v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 796).
Limitation of risks has been said to
be constitutional in opinions 8f the
Supreme Court (German Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; National
Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71).
The right of the state to guard against
overinsurance has also been recog-
nized (1 Couch on Ins., sec. 74b; see
Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Gib-
son, 256 Ky. 338).
It might be argued that the legisla-
ture, in enacting the type of statute
under consideration, had violated sec-
tion 1 (5) of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion, which provides that all men have
the inherent and inalienable right "of
acquiring and protecting property."
But does this mean the state is com-
pelled to permit a citizen to "pro-
tect" more taxable property than he is
willing to pay taxes tipon? It must
be remembered, too, that, in regulating
insurance, the legislature may abridge
the liberty of contract of both insurer
and policyholder. Hartford Live Stock
Ins. Co. v. Gibson, supra ("Contract
rights are not absolute but must yield
to the public good"); Hartford Ac-
cident Co. v. Nelson County, 291 U.
S. 352 ("The business of insurance is
one peculiarly subject to supervision
and control . . . . Liberty of contract
is not an absolute concept. It is rela-
tive to many conditions of time and
place'and circumstance. The constitu-
tion has not ordained that the forms
of business shall be cast in imperish-
able moulds"-per Cardozo, J.) ; Ken-
ton, etc., v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233
("Because of the public interest an
insurance company and its policyhold-
ers do not have the inviolate rights
which characterize private contracts.")
Two excellent pronouncements on
the limits of the police power in regu-
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lating insuraiicc arc the opiion Of
the Supreme Court in German Alli-
ance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S.
389, and the opinion of Commissioner
Stanley of the Court of Appeals in
Kenton, etc., v. Goodpaster, supra.
Both should be carefully studied,
though space does not permit lengthy
quotation from them here.
(e) The power to regulate insur-
ance may be exercised in indirect aid
of another power. This proposition
has already been sustained in Ken-
tucky. Everyone is familiar with the
common type of statute prohibiting a
murderer from collecting the proceeds
of his victim's insurance, but I refer
more particularly to such statutes as
KRS 281.450-470, requiring certain
insurance policies on taxicabs ant
city busses to conform to certain
standards, and providing that insur-
ance companies shall not be relieved
of liability on such policies until the
expiration of a fixed period after
notification to the state of intention
to cancel, regardless of any contract
between the parties. These statutes
were held constitutional and applied
in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baker,
304 Ky. 296, wherein Judge Dawson
wrote:
". .. These statutes were enacted by
the legislature in the exercise of its
police power for the safety and pro-
tection of. the public in its transpor-
tation dealings with common carriers
or operators of motor vehicles for
hire upon the highways of the Com-
monwealth. . . .The policies involved
here were executed in order that the
taxicab owner might retain his permit
and continue the operation of his
business, and the policies and the
statutes must be read and construed
together. . . .As a general rule statu-.
tory requirements are to be considered
in construing contracts of insurance,
and mandatory statutory provisions
must be .read into the policies [citing
cascs.1 ; . . . and where rcstrictive pro-
visions of a liability policy conflict
with statutory requirements, the
statute must control." (Emphasis
added.)
Equally or more significant is the
case of Gross v. Commonwealth, 256
Ky. 19, which dealt with the constitu-
tionality of KRS 281.080. The Court
wrote in part: "The appellant at-
tacks the constitutionality of this
quoted provision .. . for the reason,
he contends, that ...the Legislature
. .. is without power to delegate the
wide, unbridled authority which it
possesses to legislate to a subordinate
commission, which is here attempted,
he asserts, in this act in delegating to
the tax commission the undefined and
unlimited authority to fix the amount
of the insurance to be carried by taxi
owners 'in such penal sums or maxi-
mum amounts as said Commission
may deem necessary,' etc. . . . H6w-
ever, we do not agree that . . . the
statute here attacked is to be held in-
valid .... [The statute] clearly repre-
sents an exercise by the Legislature of
the state's police power to regulate
and govern the transportation for hire
of persons and property by motor ve-
hicles on the state's public highways,
for the protection of the interests and
welfare of its thus traveling citizens.
The means adopted by the Legislature
for their protection in the exercise of
this police power, so long as they have
an ascertainable relevancy to the ob-
ject sought, are within the scope of
that power." (Emphasis added.)
The important point is that the
Court clearly recognized that the leg-
islature could fix the amount of in-
surance to be carried, and the main
issue was merely whether it could
delegate that power. The Court held
it could. The regulation of insurance
was held a valid, constitutional means
of aiding the police power to promote
safety on the highways. No ascertain-
able reason exists why regulation of
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insurance could not be a valid means
of aiding the taxing power as well, or
of aiding in implementing the express
constitutional mandate regarding as-
sessments. As a matter of fact, the
taxing power has frequently been de-
clared by the courts to be a supreme
attribute of sovereignty, as is the
police power.
(f) If doubt exists as to the con-
stitutionality of a statute, it will be
resolved in favor of validity. This is
a maxim too well known to require
documentation here.
(g) A statute limiting the amount
of risk would be no more "unreason-
able" a regulation than existing valued
policy statutes or statutes regulating
amount of premium, amount of pro-
ceeds payable, amount of reserves,
amount of dividends, kinds of invest-
ments, or amount of deposits, or pro-
hibiting discrimination in rates, re-
bates, and so on. Yet all these things
have, over and over, been held con-
stitutional. The statute under consid-
eration would be in the public interest
and reasonably calculated to assist in
attaining the public goal of fair value
assessments for tax purposes. That
is sufficient in the circumstances.
Incidentally, the scope of any such
statute would presumably be limited
to insurance on real property improve-
ments.
II
A less stringent incentive than that
just considered might be provision for
the creation of a legal or administra-
tive presumption that, where property
is insured, the "fair cash value" is
not less than the value for which it
is insured. The presumption is reason-
able in fact, and no serious constitu-
tional question would seem to arise
if the statute were properly framed
and if the presumption were made
rebuttable.
III
Another effective method for in-
direct stimulation of local assessments
might be' to distribute state financial
aid for local schools derived from the
so-called school equalization fund on
some basis which would reflect di-
rectly the extent to which the local
units are helping themselves by meet-
ing certain minimum requirements as
to assessment. For instance, it might
prove effective to distribute this aid
on the basis of the extent to which
the local unit is approaching assess-
ment at 100 per cent of market value.
A formula for determining the amount
of aid in proportion to the improve-
ment in assessment could be worked
out by comparing the amount of reve-
nue produced locally at the existing
ratio to full value with the amount
which would be raised by a 100.per
cent valuation. There would seem to
be no constitutional obstacle to the
use of this or any other method inas-
much as the only pertinent provision,
section 186, as amended in 1940, pro-
vides:
the General Assembly shall by
general law prescribe the manner of
the distribution and use of the public
school fund for public school pur-
poses. Provided that each school dis-
trict in the Commonwealth shall re-
ceive on a census pupil basis its pro-
portionate part of at least ninety per
cent of any fund accruing to the
school fund. The remainder of any
fund accruing to the school fund may
be distributed upon other than a census
pupil basis." (Emphasis added.)
Further, at the present time KRS
157.053 requires the Kentucky Tax
Commission to certify to the State
Board of Education that any board of
education applying for aid from the
equalization fund has a ratio of as-
sessed valuation of property to fair
cash value equal to the average ratio
throughout the state. This statute, en-
acted in 1942, has not been challenged
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and there is no reason to believe that
the formula provided therein or any
other would make similar legislation
unconstitutional. Any doubt, that the
purpose of the 1940 amendment to
section 186 creating the equalization
fund and permitting it to be distributed
on other than a census pupil basis was
to leave the legislature unrestricted in
the matter is dispelled by the opinion
in Talbott v. Kentucky State Board
of Education, 244 Ky. 826, which
hastened the adoption of the amend-
ment by deploring in no uncertain
terms any constitutional restrictions on
distribution of state aid to schools.
IV
Under present practice, railroad
property and public service corpora-
tion franchises are valued by the De-
partment of Revenue at "fair cash
value." This valuation is then reduced
to a figure-now 80 per cent-which
is supposedly the average of assess-
ment ratios for all counties. The re-
duced valuation is then allocated by
standard rule and certified to the local
taxing districts which assess taxes on
that valuation regardless of whether
the local assessor is assessing other
property in the district at a 40 per
cent or 100 per cent ratio. As a re-
sult counties with low ratios actually
take tax money away from hard-
pressed counties with high ratios.
It would seem fairer to equalize
after allocation. In addition to being
fairer, equalization after allocation
would provide some incentive for
counties with low assessment ratios to
bring them up to the state average.
Could the Department of Revenue
value such property at full cash value,
allocate it to the counties and then
require the local taxing authorities to
equalize this property at the local rate
before assessing the tax against it?
Could the Department at the same
time assess for state taxes on the
same basis or on full value as reduced
under the present formula? These
problems are not simple, but it is
submitted that the proposals may be
found to satisfy the Constitution.
At one time there was no equaliza-
tion of railroad property with locally
assessed property, and the Court of
Appeals held that the resulting denial
of equality did not prevent the 100 per
cent assessment of railroad property
(Louisville Ry. v. Commonwealth,
105 Ky. 710). The Supreme Court of
the United States, however, sustained
an injunction a few years later in
L. & N. R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S.
499, on the ground that the syste-
matic assessment of railroad property
at 75 per cent by the state while local
property was assessed at 52 per cent
was discriminatory. Ever since that
time there has existed an uneasy truce
under which the Department in its
valuation takes the average assessment
ratio sufficiently into account to pre-
vent the utilities from objecting. It is
submitted that the rule of the Greene
Case would be equally well satisfied
by requiring the utility to resort -to
the county equalization board for
equalization. If the Department .it-
self puts such an equalization into
effect in advance of certification there
would seem to be no objection inso-
far as local taxes are concerned.
If the state property tax were also
assessed on the basis of the total of
the equalized allocations, it might
raise some question of uniformity (see
Mobile R. Co. v. State Tax Comm.,
374 Ill. 75, and J. W. Martin, Re-
search Report to the Virginia Public
Service Tax Study Committee, p. 85),
although that question would appear
to be little, if any, more serious than
uniformity questions which might be
raised with respect to the present pro-
cedure. If the state tax continued to
be levied on the basis now used (aver-
age of county ratios), there would
seem to be no new constitutional ob-
jection arising from the fact that a
different system was used for equaliz-
ing local taxes.
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